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AN EVALUATION OF IMMUNIZATION
REGULATIONS IN LIGHT OF RELIGIOUS
OBJECTIONS AND THE DEVELOPING RIGHT OF
PRIVACY
I.

INTRODUCTION

The spread of contagious diseases has been a major problem that
has plagued society throughout history. In the recent past, smallpox
and polio have struck down thousands of individuals, and today German Measles and other serious viruses continue to threaten the health
of our population.' Fortunately vaccines have been developed that
help prevent these diseases from spreading through our population,
and presently a large number of the communicable diseases can be
combatted. 2
Schools are the most likely place for the spread of contagious
diseases because of the daily contact of large numbers of students and
teachers. 3 The states have developed measures to attempt to deal with
this potential health problem." Most have either passed compulsory
immunization laws for school children or have promulgated regulations that require immunization as a condition precedent to admission
to school. 5 Other states have delegated power to local boards of education to make reasonable regulations concerning the immunization of
1.

It has been estimated that prior to the development of the vaccine, smallpox

was the killer of eighty thousand people a year in England. 14 COMPTON'S ENCYCLOPEDIA 559 (1966). See also Jacobson v. Massachusetts, 197 U.S. 11, 31 n.1
(1905).
2. After the vaccination for smallpox was discovered, epidemics of smallpox
became rare and the mortality rate rapidly declined. This was similarly true with the
crippling disease of polio. Once the vaccination for polio was created in 1954, the
disease stopped existing in epidemic proportions. 14 COMPTON'S ENCYCLOPEDIA 559
(1966). See also M.

3.

See

FISHBEIN, MEDICAL AND HEALTH ENCYCLOPEDIA 443 (1966).
U.S. DEPARTMENT OF HEALTH, EDUCATION, AND WELFARE, PARENTS'

GUIDE TO CHILDHOOD IMMUNIZATION 4 (1977)
CHILDHOOD IMMUNIZATION].

[hereinafter cited as GUIDE TO
Today the nation's school age children are in danger of

catching seven serious diseases: measles, polio, rubella, mumps, diphtheria, pertussis,
and tetanus. Id.
4. Many of the children in the United States today are vaccinated and immunized against the more prevalent diseases to prevent the reoccurrence of the epidemics of
the past. Nevertheless, a high percentage of children remain unvaccinated. Id.
5. See, e.g., MASS. GEN. LAWS ANN. ch.76, §15 (West Supp. 1979), which provides:

No child shall, except as hereinafter provided, be admitted to school except
upon presentation of a physician's certificate that the child has been successfully
immunized against diphtheria, pertussis, tetanus, measles and poliomyelitis and-
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school children, 6 and these delegations of power have generally been
such other communicable diseases as may be specified from time to time by the
department of public health.
A child shall be admitted to school upon certification by a physician that he has
personally examined such child and that in his opinion the physical condition of
the child is such that his health would be endangered by such vaccination or by
any of such immunizations. Such certification shall be submitted at the beginning
of each school year to the physician in charge of the school health program. If the
physician in charge of the school health program does not agree with the opinion
of the child's physician, the matter shall be referred to the department of public
health, whose decision will be final.
In the absence of an emergency or epidemic of disease declared by the department of public health, no child whose parent or guardian states in writing that
vaccination or immunization conflicts with his sincere religious beliefs shall be required to present said physician's certificate in order to be admitted to school.
See also N.Y. PuB. HEALTH LAW §2164 (McKinney 1977); ARK. STAT. ANN. §80-1548
(Supp. 1977); KAN. STAT. §72-5209 (Supp. 1977).
6. See, e.g., OHIo REV. CODE ANN. §3313.67 (Page Supp. 1978), which in pertinent part provides:
The board of education of each city, exempted village, or local school district may
make and enforce such rules to secure the immunization of and to prevent the spread
of communicable diseases among the pupils attending or eligible to attend
the schools of the district, as in its opinion the safety and interest of the public require. Boards of health, legislative authorities of municipal corporations, and
boards of township trustees, on application of the board of education of the
district at the public expense, without delay, shall provide the means of immunization to pupils who are not so provided by their parents or guardians.
OHIO REV. CODE ANN. §3313.671 (Page Supp. 1978), in pertinent part provides:
Except as otherwise provided in this division, no pupil, at the time of his initial entry or at the beginning of each school year, to an elementary or high school for
which the state board of education prescribes minimum standards . . . shall be
permitted to remain in school for more than fourteen days unless he presents written evidence satisfactory to the person in charge of admission, that he has been
immunized by a method of immunization approved by the department of health
... against poliomyelitis, pertussis, rubeola, and rubella, or is in the process of being
so immunized.
1. A pupil who has had natural rubeola, and presents a signed statement from
his parent or physician to that effect, is not required to be immunized against
rubeola.
2. A female pupil who has reached puberty is not required to be immunized
against rubella.
3. A pupil who presents a written statement of his parent or guardian in which
the parent or guardian objects to the immunization for good cause, including
religious convictions, is not required to be immunized.
4. A child whose physician certifies in writing that such immunization against
any disease is medically contraindicated is not required to be immunized against
that disease. This section does not limit or impair the right of a board of education of a city, exempted village, or local school district to make and enforce rules
to secure immunization against poliomyelitis, rubeola, rubella, diphtheria, pertussis, and tetanus of the pupils under its jurisdiction. (emphasis added).
Mack v. Board of Educ., 1 Ohio App. 2d 143, 204 N.E.2d 86 (1963), interpreted
§3313.671 before its 1978 amendment, and found that §3313.671 was designed to set
minimum requirements for immunization of school children, but does not limit the
local boards of education to pass reasonable regulations in their own discretion. The
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upheld. 7
While most people in our society readily comply with these public
health regulations, some possess strong convictions against submitting

their body, or their children's bodies, to those immunizations and vaccinations.' Christian Scientists are an example of a group in which
many members strongly object to these medical practices. 9 Further-

more, there are other students and parents who have strong personal
feelings against immunizations or fear their ill effects,' 0 especially after
the recent problems encountered with the swine flu vaccinations.

Because our society is cognizant of the rights of minorities, a serious
question can arise whether these dissenting individuals must submit to
the regulations or whether constitutionally protected rights permit
them to refuse immunizations.
This comment examines the effect of state laws requiring the vac-

cination and immunization of school children on their fundamental
religious rights and right of personal privacy. The discussion will be
limited to this area and will not consider immunization laws that are
passed for all citizens in epidemic situations, although some of the
arguments in both situations are analogous." The comment will first
1978 amendment did not change the basic principles previously incorporated in
§3313.671.
7. Mack v. Board of Educ., I Ohio App. 2d 143, 204 N.E.2d 86 (1963); Herbert
v. Board of Educ., 197 Ala. 617, 73 So. 321 (1916); State v. Martin, 134 Ark. 420, 204
S.W. 622 (1918). But see Potts v. Breen, 167 Ill. 67, 47 N.E. 81 (1897) (state legislature
should not delegate this power except in emergency situations).
8. McCartney v. Austin, 57 Misc. 2d 525, 293 N.Y.S.2d 188 (1968), affd, 298
N.Y.S.2d 26 (1969); Wright v. DeWitt School Dist., 238 Ark. 906, 385 S.W.2d 644
(1965); Hartman v. May, 168 Miss. 477, 151 So. 737 (1934); New Braunfels v.
Waldschmidt, 109 Tex. 302, 207 S.W. 303 (1918); Dunham v. Board of Educ., 154
Ohio St. 469, 96 N.E.2d 413 (1951). There are a large number of cases in which parents
refuse to submit their children to these requirements. See Annot., 93 A.L.R. 1413
(1934).
9. See Board of Educ. v. Maas, 56 N.J. Super. 245, 152 A.2d 394 (1959), cert.
denied, 363 U.S. 843 (1960).
10. See, e.g., McCartney v. Austin;, 57 Misc. 2d 525, 293 N.Y.S.2d 188 (1968),
aff'd, 298 N.Y.S.2d 26 (1969); In re Elwell, 55 Misc. 2d 252, 284 N.Y.S.2d 924 (1967);
Dalli v. Board of Educ., 358 Mass. 753, 267 N.E.2d 219 (1971). Like most types of
medicines, vaccinations and immunizations can cause side effects. The side effects are
usually mild and brief in duration, as a slight fever, a sore arm, or a mild rash. On
some rare occasions, however, the side effects can become serious. GUIDE TO
CHILDHOOD IMMUNIZATION, supra note 3, at 5.

I1. Adults have a stronger constitutional argument against vaccination and immunization laws than do parents who object to their child's immunization. The adult
objector will bring danger only to himself, while the parent objector threatens the
health of his child. Recent Supreme Court rulings seem to provide wider leniency for
religious freedom when the only affected person is the one who is objecting on
religious grounds. See Wisconsin v. Yoder, 406 U.S. 205 (1972). See also L. TRIBE.
AMERICAN CONSTITUTIONAL LAW 857 (1978).
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review the historical basis for immunization laws and examine how
these laws have been consistently upheld against various legal
challenges. Secondly, the constitutional religious arguments against
these laws will be discussed, and an evaluation will be made as to their
potential success in the future. Third, the requirements of vaccination
and immunization of school children will be assessed in terms of the
developing right of privacy. Although immunization regulations for
school children are generally upheld as a legitimate exercise of state
power, a reexamination of these regulations is called for because of
recent developments in the constitutional challenges raised against
them. While it is probable that such immunization regulations will continue to be upheld, there are strong arguments against such requirements that should be considered.
II.

PAST TREATMENT OF IMMUNIZATION LAWS

A. The Basis of Immunization Requirements
States have the authority through their police power to make
reasonable rules and regulations for the promotion of the public
health, safety, and welfare." It is under this broad grant of authority
that state legislation has been enacted requiring the vaccination and
immunization of school children as a condition precedent to school
attendance.' 3 The underlying justification behind immunization
legislation is that it is within the state's police power to protect the
public from the spread of communicable diseases, and that there is a
substantial relationship between such legislation and the protection of
5
the public health."' Jacobson v. Massachusetts,' decided in 1905, is
the authority most often cited to justify state laws requiring immunization of school children.' 6 In Jacobson, a city in Massachusetts passed a
compulsory vaccination law that required all adult citizens to be vaccinated due to the threatened epidemic of smallpox, and the law was
12. Jacobson v. Massachusetts, 197 U.S. 11, 25 (1905).
13. See, e.g., Maier v. Besser, 73 Misc. 2d 24.1, 341 N.Y.S.2d 411 (1972); Field v.
Robinson, 198 Pa. 638, 48 A. 873 (1901); Abeel v. Clark, 84 Cal. 226, 24 P. 383
(1890); Wright v. DeWitt School Dist., 238 Ark. 906, 385 S.W.2d 644 (1965); Hartman
v. May, 168 Miss. 477, 151 So. 737 (1934).
14. Jacobson v. Massachusetts, 197 U.S. 11, 31 (1905). Vaccination was made
compulsory for smallpox in various foreign countries from 1807 to 1882, and the
statistical evidence proved that death due to smallpox quickly reduced in numbers. Id.
at 31 n.1.
15. 197 U.S. 11 (1905).
16. Although the Jacobson case does not specifically deal with immunization
requirements for school children, it is still referred to as justifying such requirements as
appropriate incidents of the state police power. See, e.g., Wright v. DeWitt School
Dist., 238 Ark. 906, 385 S.W.2d 644 (1965); Board of Educ. v. Maas, 56 N.J. Super.
245, 152 A.2d 394 (1959), cert. denied, 363 U.S. 843 (1960).
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challenged as an unconstitutional infringement of personal liberty. The
Supreme Court upheld the statute as a valid exercise of the police
power, finding that a person's right of liberty must necessarily give
way to reasonable restraints for the protection of the health and safety
of the state." The Court noted: "According to settled principles the
police power of a state must be held to embrace, at least, such
reasonable regulations established directly by legislative enactments as
will protect the public health and public safety."' 8
Although the Jacobson case is generally cited as justifying state immunization requirements for school children, the Court's opinion contains a basis for distinction. The Court stressed the public necessity of
the situation in holding the Massachusetts statute valid.' 9 The statute
had been passed during a smallpox epidemic and at a period of time in
history when infectious diseases often scourged our population. Thus,
it can be argued that in the absence of such an emergency situation the
state legislatures may be more restricted in compelling these medical
practices. 2" Possibly the state government should bring the preventive
vaccine to the attention of the public but not compel innoculation.
Nevertheless, state immunization regulations have been regularly
found valid regardless of whether an emergency existed at the time or
not under the view that the state may exercise its police power to continually thwart the spread of infectious diseases. 2 In Pierce v. Board
17. Jacobson v. Massachusetts, 197 U.S. II, 26 (1905).
18. Id. at 25. Later in the decision the Court stressed:
We are not prepared to hold that a minority, residing or remaining in any city or
town where smallpox is prevalent, and enjoying the general protection afforded by
an organized local government, may thus defy the will of its constituted
authorities, acting in good faith for all, under the legislative sanction of the State.
If such be the privilege of a minority then a like privilege would belong to each individual of the community, and the spectacle would be presented of the welfare
and safety of an entire population being subordinated to the notions of a single individual who chooses to remain a part of that population.

Id. at 37-38.
19. Id. at 28.
20. During the course of the Jacobson decision the Court recognized that there
may be instances when they would have to step in to protect the interests of the individuals objecting to these laws. The Court stated:
flt might be that an acknowledged power of a local community to protect itself
against an epidemic threatening the safety of all, might be exercised in particular
circumstances and in reference to particular persons in such an arbitrary,
unreasonable manner, or might go so far beyond what was reasonably required
for the safety of the public, as to authorize or compel the courts to interfere for
the protection of such persons.
Id. (citations omitted).
21. See, e.g., In re Elwell, 55 Misc. 2d 252, 284 N.Y.S.2d 924 (1967); Allen v.
Ingalls, 182 Ark. 991, 33 S.W.2d 1099 (1931); Board of Educ. v. Maas, 56 N.J.Super.
245, 152 A.2d 394 (1959), cert. denied, 363 U.S. 843 (1960); Wright v. DeWitt School
Dist., 238 Ark. 906, 385 S.W.2d 644 (1965).
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of Education2 2 a New York court reasoned that states need not await
emergencies before the passage of such rules. The court pointed out:
The experience of the race has taught, to protect the health of the community, to protect the health of man, precautions must be taken against
the spread of disease, and vaccination is to prevent not only sickness of
the person not vaccinated, but consequences to those with whom such
3
person might come in contact."
The Jacobson case dealt with an instance of compulsory vaccination for adults during a threatened epidemic. Today the immunization
regulations for children are often further justified, in both emergency
and non-emergency situations, on the grounds that the laws are not
compulsory.2 ' The states point out that the immunization requirements
are just conditions that must be fulfilled to be permitted to attend
school. 2" Nevertheless, in a very fundamental way the immunization
laws are compulsory. If a parent objects to their child's immunization
the only realistic alternative left to them is to keep their child from
school, which is an impractical choice in the complex society in which
we live. 26 Furthermore, because school attendance is compulsory,
parents have been convicted of neglect when they have kept their
children from attending school because they objected to the immuniza28
tions. 27 In the case of Cude v. State the Arkansas court not only convicted the parents of neglect, but also removed the children from the
custody of the parents. Therefore, the immunization regulations are
essentially compulsory.
B. Legal Challenges to Vaccination and Immunization Requirements
Legislation requiring the vaccination and immunization of school
children has been frequently challenged. Some have argued that these
regulations for school children violate their right to attend public
to
school by refusing them admission unless they submit
22. 30 Misc. 2d 1039, 219 N.Y.S.2d 519 (1961).
23. Id. at 1040, 219 N.Y.S.2d at 521.
24. See Milhoof v. Board of Educ., 76 Ohio St. 297, 81 N.E. 568 (1907).
25. Id. See also 48 OHIO JUR. 2d Schools §174 (1966).
that does
26. There is also the alternative of sending the child to a private school
limits
however,
schools,
private
of
expense
not require these medical practices. The
boards
local
that
probability
the
also
is
there
and
parents,
of
majority
a
for
this choice
of education will require immunization in these schools.
In re
27. See, e.g., In re Gregory S, 85 Misc. 2d 846, 380 N.Y.S.2d 620 (1976);
Va.
188
Commonwealth,
v.
Rice
Elwell, 55 Misc. 2d 252, 284 N.Y.S.2d 924 (1967);
224, 49 S.E.2d 342 (1948).
28. 237 Ark. 927, 377 S.W.2d 816 (1964). In this case the court directed the
children to be placed in the welfare division, to be immunized, and then to be sent to
school.
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inoculation.2 9 This argument has, however, been rejected on the principle that the right to attend public schools does have necessary restric-

tions, one of which is compliance with state regulations that promote
the public health.3 0 Similarly, the immunization regulations have-been
challenged as being in conflict with the compulsory education laws of
the states.3" The argument is that since the state compels children to attend school, it is acting inconsistently by requiring the children to be
immunized before they can attend. Nevertheless, the courts have held
that compulsory education statutes do not impose duties conflicting
with immunization requirements, as those statutes must of necessity be
subordinated to the immunization regulations for the safety of
society.3 2

Immunization regulations for school children have also been
challenged as being discriminatory and violative of constitutional rights
to equal treatment under the law. 3" Immunization laws affect only
children eligible to attend school, and younger children and adults do
not fall within the requirements. The state courts have strongly rejected
this argument, holding that a state may through its police powr require
the immunization of school children, and its regulations are valid even

though the effect of the regulation is visited on children alone.3 ' The
large number of school children in close physical proximity creates a
greater opportunity for the communication of disease, and provides a
rational basis for the state's disparate treatment. Likewise, these

29. See, e.g., Milhoof v. Board of Educ., 76 Ohio St. 297, 81 N.E. 568 (1907);
Hartman v. May, 168 Miss. 477, 151 So. 737 (1934); Cox v. Board of Educ., 21 Utah
401, 60 P. 1013 (1900). The argument that the immunization regulations violate the
children's right to attend school was rejected in all of these cases.
30. Hartman v. May, 168 Miss. 477, 151 So. 737 (1934). In the case of Freeman v.
Zimmerman, 86 Minn. 353, 90 N.W. 783 (1902), the court held: "The welfare of the
many is superior to that of the few, and, as the regulations compelling vaccination are
intended and enforced solely for the public good, the rights conferred thereby are
primary and superior to the rights of any pupil to attend the public schools." Id. at
361, 90 N.W. at 786.
31. See, e.g., Hartman v. May, 168 Miss. 477, 151 So. 737 (1934); Booth v. Board
of Educ., 70 S.W.2d 350 (Tex. Civ. App. 1934). The argument that immunization laws
are in conflict with the compulsory education laws of the state was rejected in both
these cases.
32. Hartman v. May, 168 Miss. 477, 151 So. 737 (1934). This court recognized
that the state statute making school attendance compulsory did not preclude the
municipality from refusing admission to city schools those who had not been vaccinated.
33. See, e.g., Herbert v. Board of Educ., 197 Ala. 617, 73 So. 321 (1916); Zucht
v. King, 225 S.W. 267 (Tex. Civ. App. 1920). The argument that immunization laws
for school children are discriminatory was rejected in both of these cases.
34. Id.
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regulations have been held to be a valid exercise of the police power
not contravening due process of law. 35

These are the most significant attacks on the vaccination and
immunization laws in this century. The courts have decided that the
states may pass these regulations in either emergency or nonemergency situations as an exercise of their police power. The Arkan36
sas Supreme Court in Wright v. DeWitt School District boldly stated:
"According to the great weight of authority, it is within the police
power of the State to require that school children be vaccinated ....
and that such requirement does not violate the constitutional rights of
anyone .... In fact this principle is so firmly settled that no extensive
discussion is required."3 7 While the law may seem settled there are,
however, persuasive arguments against such immunization regulations.
III.

A.

THE RELIGIOUS RIGHTS CHALLENGE TO IMMUNIZATION LAWS

Religious Attacks in the Past

Statutes requiring the vaccination and immunization of school
children have been continuously attacked as an infringement on the free
exercise of religion. 38 The basic contention is that certain individuals
possess sincere religious beliefs against such medical treatment, and to
require them or their children to submit to immunization is an
infringement of their constitutional right to the free exercise of their
religion."
The free exercise of religion is specifically guaranteed in the first
amendment of the United States Constitution and is, therefore, a
preferentially protected value."0 Nevertheless, it is not an absolute
35. New Braunfels v. Waldschmidt, 109 Tex. 302, 207 S.W. 303 (1918). In New
Braunfels, a vaccination requirement for school children was attacked as depriving an
individual of liberty and property without due process of law. The court, however,
completely rejected this contention by citing the Jacobson decision.
36. 238 Ark. 906, 385 S.W.2d 644 (1965). In this case the DeWitt School District,
pursuant to a state health regulation, required all school children to be vaccinated
against smallpox as a prerequisite to attending school. The court rejected the religious
challenge to the requirement.
37. Id. at 908, 385 S.W.2d at 646 (emphasis in original).
38. Vonnegut v. Baun, 206 Ind. 172, 188 N.E. 677 (1934); New Braunfels v.
Waldschmidt, 109 Tex. 302, 207 S.W. 303 (1918); Dunham v. Board of Educ., 154
Ohio St. 469, 96 N.E.2d 413 (1951); Wright v. DeWitt School Dist., 238 Ark. 906, 385
S.W.2d 644 (1965); In re Gregory S,85 Misc. 2d 846, 380 N.Y.S.2d 620 (1976).
39. Cude v. State, 237 Ark. 927, 377 S.W.2d 816 (1964); Board of Educ. v. Maas,
56 N.J. Super. 245, 152 A.2d 394 (1959), cert. denied, 363 U.S. 843 (1960).
40. U.S. CONST. amend. I provides: "Congress shall make no law respecting an
establishment of religion, or prohibiting the free exercise thereof; or abridging the
freedom of speech, or of the press; or the right of the people peaceably to assemble, and
to petition the Government for a redress of grievances."
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right. 4 ' Religious beliefs, even if deeply held, do not free individuals
from the responsibility to obey regulations which are passed for the
protection of society.4 2 The right is limited by compelling state

interest.43 A major state interest is the protection of the public from
the spread of communicable disease. One method to further this pro-

tection is requiring the vaccination and immunization of school
children before they can associate with their classmates.

Constitutional religious arguments against immunization laws for
school children have never directly reached the Supreme Court. In

Jacobson v. Massachusetts" the Court did emphatically state that the
rights of the individual must be subservient to the protection of the
public against the spread of communicable disease, but the challenge

in that case was not on religious grounds. In Prince v. Massachusetts"
the Court was faced with a religious argument against a child labor
statute, but in dicta the Court spoke out against religious challenges to
vaccination and immunization requirements, stating: "Thus, he cannot claim freedom from compulsory vaccination for the child more
than for himself on religious grounds. The right to practice religion
freely does not include liberty to expose the community or the child to
' 46
communicable disease or the latter to ill health or death.
The state courts, however, have frequently considered the religious

argument. State courts have consistently rejected the religious
arguments and upheld the validity of vaccination and immunization

laws."" The primary reasoning of the courts in rejecting the religious
arguments has been that the state's power to promote the public health
and welfare by taking adequate precautions to avert the spread of
disease must certainly take precedence over the private religious con-

victions of a minority of individuals."' Religious beliefs of the in41. The first amendment specifically applies to Congress, but its prohibition has
been made applicable to the states through the fourteenth amendment. See Wisconsin
v. Yoder, 406 U.S. 205 (1972).
42. See West Virginia Bd. of Educ. v. Barnette, 319 U.S. 624, 643 (1943).
43. Wisconsin v. Yoder, 406 U.S. 205 (1972).
44. 197 U.S. 11 (1905) (compulsory vaccination law passed during a threatened
smallpox epidemic was challenged as being an infringement of personal liberty).
45. 321 U.S. 158 (1944) (parent challenged a Massachusetts child labor law, on
behalf of his child, on constitutional religious grounds).
46. Id. at 166-67. The Court also cited Jacobson for the-authority that an adult
cannot claim freedom from compulsory vaccination for a child more than for himself
on religious grounds. Id. at 166.
47. See, e.g., New Braunfels v. Waldschmidt, 109 Tex. 302, 207 S.W. 303 (1918);
Sadlock v. Board of Educ., 137 N.J.L. 85, 58 A.2d 218 (1948); Cude v. State, 237
Ark. 927, 377 S.W.2d 816 (1964); Dunham v. Board of Educ., 154 Ohio St. 469, 96
N.E.2d 413 (1951).
48. See, e.g., Dalli v. Board of Educ., 358 Mass. 753, 267 N.E.2d 219 (1971);
Board of Educ. v. Maas, 56 N.J. Super. 245, 152 A.2d 394 (1959), cert. denied, 363
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dividual should not be recognized when to do so may lead to harm for
the rest of society."' The Arkansas Supreme Court, refusing to
recognize a religious claim against an immunization law, noted in Cude
v. State:"0 "In cases too numerous to mention it has been held, in effect, that a person's right to exhibit religious freedom ceases where it
overlaps and transgresses the rights of others."'"
Generally the state courts have applied a balancing type test,"2
weighing the state's interest against the infringement of the individual's
religious rights. But in the application of the test the state's interest in
combatting disease has been consistently, and with minimal discussion,
found to outweigh the religious rights of the individual. Therefore, the

individual or his or her child has been required to submit to the immunization laws as a condition of school attendance." More recently,
state courts summarily assume that immunization requirements are
legally valid, and are not truly balancing the interests at all.

"

Thus, in

many jurisdictions it is virtually impossible to challenge the immunization and vaccination requirements on the principle of constitutional
religious rights."
U.S. 843 (1960); Cude v. State, 237 Ark. 927, 377 S.W.2d 816 (1964); McCartney v.
Austin, 57 Misc. 2d 525, 298 N.Y.S.2d 26 (1969). A New Jersey court in Sadlock v.

Board of Educ., 137 N.J.L. 85, 91, 58 A.2d 218, 222 (1949), noted: "So too, with
respect to the guaranty of religious liberty, the constitutional guaranty of religious
freedom was not intended to prohibit legislation with respect to the general public
welfare." And the Arkansas Supreme Court in Wright v. DeWitt School Dist., 238
Ark. 906, 913, 385 S.W.2d 644, 648 (1965), provided:
Appellants are at liberty to enjoy unrestrained their religious opinions and beliefs.
However, their freedom to act according to their religious beliefs is subject to a
reasonable regulation for the benefit of society as a whole. We reaffirm that the
health regulation in question is a reasonable exercise of police power on a subject
of paramount and compelling state interest and, therefore, is valid.
49. Id. In the majority of these cases upholding the immunization laws there has
been no threatening health problem in existence.
50. 237 Ark. 927, 377 S.W.2d 816 (1964).
51. Id. at 933, 377 S.W.2d at 819.
52. While the state courts did not precisely say that they were applying a balancing test, they generally carefully evaluated the legal position of the religious
challengers, and then the position of the state's legal justification, before they rendered
a decision. See, e.g., New Braunfels v. Waldschmidt, 109 Tex. 302, 207 S.W. 303
(1918); Sadlock v. Board of Educ., 137 N.J.L. 85, 58 A.2d 218 (1948). See also Antieau, The Limitation of Religious Liberty, 18 FORDHAM L. REv. 221 (1949).
53. See, e.g., Wright v. DeWitt School Dist., 238 Ark. 906, 385 S.W.2d 644
(1965); In re Gregory S,85 Misc. 2d 846, 380 N.Y.S.2d 620 (1976); Dunham v. Board
of Educ., 154 Ohio St. 469, 96 N.E.2d 413 (1951). See also note 47 supra.
54.

The courts unquestionably rely on the results of previous cases for their

dismissal of the religious challenges. See, e.g.,
St. 469, 96 N.E.2d 413 (1951); Cude v. State,
Board of Educ. v. Maas, 56 N.J. Super. 245,
U.S. 843 (1960); Maier v. Besser, 73 Misc. 2d
55. See, e.g., Wright v. DeWitt School
(1965); Dunham v. Board of Educ., 154 Ohio
https://ecommons.udayton.edu/udlr/vol4/iss2/10

Dunham v. Board of Educ., 154 Ohio
237 Ark. 927, 377 S.W.2d 816 (1964);
152 A.2d 394 (1959), cert. denied, 363
241, 341 N.Y.S.2d 411 (1972).
Dist., 238 Ark. 906, 385 S.W.2d 644
St. 469, 96 N.E.2d 413 (1951); Mack v.
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On the other hand, some state legislatures have passed legislative
exemptions to the immunization requirements for individuals who hold
sincere religious beliefs that oppose immunizations. 6 Furthermore,
other state legislatures have given religious exemption guidelines but
have left the decision whether to permit the exemption to the discretion
of the local authorities."
B.

The Religious Argument in Other Areas

The first amendment of the United States Constitution guarantees
the free exercise of religion."8 In the concept of the free exercise of
religion a distinction has been drawn between "religious beliefs" and
"actions based on religious beliefs."" Initially the Supreme Court in
United States v. Reynolds ° declared that the free exercise of religion
extended only to religious beliefs and did not reach conduct based on
religious convictions. Therefore, an individual could maintain his
religious thoughts, but he could not express those thoughts in conduct,
Board of Educ., 1 Ohio App. 2d 143, 204 N.E.2d 86 (1963); Board of Educ. v. Maas,
56 N.J. Super. 245, 152 A.2d 394 (1959), cert. denied, 363 U.S. 843 (1960). See also
Maier v. Besser, 73 Misc. 2d 241, 341 N.Y.S.2d 411 (1972).
56. The state legislature of Massachusetts has recently given preference to
religious objectors in this area. MASS. GEN. LAWS ANN. ch. 76, §15 (West Supp. 1979),
in pertinent part provides:
In the absence of an emergency or epidemic of disease declared by the department of public health, no child whose parent or guardian states in writing that
vaccination or immunization conflicts with his sincere religious beliefs shall be
required to present said physician's certificate in order to be admitted to school.
See note 5 supra. The state of New York, a state with serious epidemics in the past,
also gives preference to religious objections. N.Y. Pun. HEALTH LAW §2164(9)
(McKinney 1977), provides:
This section shall not apply to children whose parent, parents, or guardian are
bona fide members of a recognized religious organization whose teachings are
contrary to the practices herein required, and no certificate shall be required as a
prerequisite to such children being admitted or received into school or attending
school.
The state of Texas also has created such an exemption in deference to religious beliefs.
See Itz. v. Penick, 493 S.W.2d 506 (Tex. Sup. Ct. 1973), appeal dismissed for lack of
substantial fed. question, 412 U.S. 925, rehearing denied, 414 U.S. 882 (1973).
57. See OHIO REV. CODE ANN. § 3313.67 (Page Supp. 1978); OHIO REV. CODE ANN.
§ 3313.671 (Page Supp. 1978), note 6 supra. See also KY. REV. STAT. ANN.
§214.034 (Baldwin 1978); Ky. REV. STAT. ANN. §214.036 (Baldwin 1978). This statute
permits the local authorities to reject religious objections during epidemics.
58. See note 40 supra.
59. United States v. Reynolds, 98 U.S. 145 (1878). See also G. GUNTHER, CONSTITUTIONAL LAW 1505 (9th ed. 1975).
60. 98 U.S. 145 (1878). In the Reynolds case the Court upheld a state statute
which prohibited polygamy against an attack by an individual whose religious beliefs
required that he take more than one wife. See also L. TRIBE, supra note 11, at 837, for
an examination of this area.
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if the conduct was violative of any state regulation. Then in 1940, the
Supreme Court in Cantwell v. Connecticut,' indicated that although
conduct based on religious convictions is subject to greater regulation
than belief, such conduct may also be protected from state interference
in appropriate circumstances. 6 2 More recently, the Court has explicitly
taken this conduct approach a step further, and developed the theory
that the religious objector can claim exemption from regulations of
conduct on religious grounds.6 3 The Court now recognizes that an in,dividual has a right to freely exercise his own religious beliefs, and to
'reflect those beliefs in his conduct. Furthermore, the state must
demonstrate a compelling interest to justify any substantial interference with this fundamental right of religion."
The Court gave its most decisive opinion in this area in Wisconsin
v. Yoder. 65 Wisconsin had a compulsory education law that required
all children to attend school until the age of sixteen. A tenet of the
Amish sect, however, is that education past the eighth grade will be
harmful to their children, and therefore the Amish challenged the
Wisconsin law as being an infringement of their free exercise of
religion. The Court discussed three elements that should be considered
in such cases. First, the individual objecting to the state laws must hold
sincere religious beliefs conflicting with such laws; secular values will
not suffice." Secondly, the state legislation must be shown to infringe
on the religious rights of the individual by directly interfering with his
or her religiously motivated conduct.6 7 Third, if the first two elements
are found to exist, the balancing test must be applied to determine if
the state can demonstrate a compelling interest to override the religious
rights. 8 In the application of these elements the Court concluded that
the Amish held sincere religious beliefs that were expressed in their
conduct, and which were directly infringed upon by the compulsory

61. 310 U.S. 296 (1940).
62. In Cantwell, the Court reversed the convictions of Jehovah's Witnesses for
seeking religious contributions without a state certificate to do so, and for causing a
breach of the peace. The Court articulated that the first amendment of the United States
Constitution protects not only freedom to believe, but also freedom to act in certain
situations. Id. at 303-04. Nevertheless, the Court did not indicate when "conduct"
may be regulated, and what the appropriate standard of,judicial review was in those
circumstances. See G. GUNTHER, supra note 59, at 1507.
63. See Sherbert v. Verner, 374 U.S. 398 (1963); Wisconsin v. Yoder, 406 U.S.
205 (1972).

64. Id.
65. 406 U.S. 205 (1972).
66. Id.at 215.
67.
68.

Id. at 218-19.
Id.at 221.
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education law. Furthermore, the Court found that the state could not
demonstrate a compelling interest in the case because permitting the
Amish to leave school after the eighth grade did not indicate any
future significant harm to society. 69
A judicial finding that a state regulation infringes upon the fundamental right of the free exercise of religion requires the court to apply the balancing of interests test to adequately consider all of the factors involved. 70 The balancing test in the area of first amendment
freedoms presently involves the least restrictive alternative and compelling state interest mode of analysis."1 This strict scrutiny method of
analysis requires a showing of some compelling state interest, and a
demonstration that the state goals cannot be achieved in less restrictive
ways, if the state regulation is to survive the constitutional challenge."
Since the state could not meet this test in Wisconsin v. Yoder, the state
regulation was declared invalid. 3
C. An Evaluation of the Religious Contention Against Immunization
Laws
The contentions raised by the Amish against compulsory education
laws in Wisconsin v. Yoder are analogous to the arguments made by
religious objectors to immunization laws. In the first instance, Christian Scientists and other religious organizations hold sincere religious
convictions against immunization that are expressed in their objections
to such medical treatment. Secondly, the state immunization laws obviously infringe on these fundamental religious tenets by requiring the
religious objectors to submit to medical treatment which is contrary to
their deeply-held beliefs. Once these first two elements of foder are
fulfilled, the courts should then apply the least restrictive alternative
69. Id. at 224-25.
70. See, e.g., Cantwell v. Connecticut, 310 U.S. 296 (1940); West Virginia Bd. of
Educ. v. Barnette, 319 U.S. 624 (1943); Sherbert v. Verner, 374 U.S. 398 (1963);
Wisconsin v. Yoder, 406 U.S. 205 (1972).
71. Sherbert v. Verner, 374 U.S. 398 (1963); Wisconsin v. Yoder, 406 U.S. 205
(1972). See also L. TRIBE, supra note 11, at 846-59. The more recent method of
analysis is often referred to as strict scrutiny. At an earlier time in this century the
Court had applied a test which required the state to show that the conduct regulated
presented a clear and present danger to society. Cantwell v. Connecticut, 310 U.S. 296,
311 (1940).

72. Sherbert v. Verner, 374 U.S. 398 (1963); Wisconsin v. Yoder, 406 U.S. 205
(1972). It should be noted that although strict scrutiny seems clear in principle, it is
often extremely difficult to determine precisely how the Court is applying it. In Yoder
the Court required the state to actually demonstrate a compelling state interest.
73. Strict scrutiny analysis is also used by the court when the fundamental fight of
personal privacy, discussed in section IV below, is involved. See, e.g., Roe v. Wade,
410 U.S. 113 (1973).
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compelling state interest mode of analysis, and require a showing of a
compelling state interest before this fundamental right can be infringed.
In light of the Yoder decision, and recent legislative trends in
various jurisdictions giving preference to religious beliefs, significant
alterations may occur in the area of compulsory immunizations for
school children. Presently, state courts do not seem to be applying a
balancing test to any real extent, but instead rely primarily on precedent in making the absolute assumption that the state interests
outweigh the religious rights of the individual. 7 4 Courts should,
however, begin to closely scrutinize the immunization area by carefully
applying the strict scrutiny mode of analysis.
Strict scrutiny analysis requires that the state demonstrate a compelling interest sufficient to override the religious rights of the
individual. The states can argue that a compelling state interest still
remains and that it outweighs the rights of individuals. The states can
stress that immunizations are needed for the protection of the community because without the immunization of school children the
possibility of the spread of communicable diseases is heightened. 5
Furthermore, the states can point out that it is not only the protection
of the community that is at stake but also the protection of the
children themselves. 76 Immunization regulations for school children
are generally objected to by the parents of the child. It is not the
parents, however, who face the immediate risk of contracting the
disease but rather the child. Therefore, the states can assert that they
are concerned not with the religious objector, but with the health and
welfare of the religious objector's child. Finally, the states can rely
heavily on precedent for demonstrating the long standing recognition
of the compelling nature of this state interest. 7 7

74. See note 54 supra. The state courts generally cite Jacobson v. Massachusetts,
or other state court decisions, in ruling that it is settled that the states may validly pass
such immunization regulations. See Maier v. Besser, 73 Misc. 2d 241, 341 N.Y.S.2d
411 (1972); Cude v. State, 237 Ark. 927, 377 S.W.2d 816 (1964).
75. See Board of Educ. v. Maas, 56 N.J. Super. 245, 152 A.2d 394 (1959), cert.
denied, 363 U.S. 843 (1960).

76. The states do have an arguable interest in protecting the child from harm. In
past cases courts have concluded that parents cannot prevent their children from
receiving medical treatment, on religious grounds, when the child's health would be
seriously jeopardized. See, e.g., Jehovah's Witnesses v. King County Hosp., 278 F.
Supp. 188 (1968) (child required to have a blood transfusion to save his life); In re

Green, 448 Pa. 338, 292 A.2d 387 (1972). See also L.

TRIBE,

supra note 11, at 850.

77. See, e.g., Jacobson v. Massachusetts, 197 U.S. 11 (1905); Cude v. State, 237
Ark. 927, 377 S.W.2d 816 (1964); Board of Educ. v. Maas, 56 N.J. Super. 245, 152
A.2d 394 (1959), cert. denied, 363 U.S. 843 (1960); Maier v. Besser, 73 Misc. 2d 241,
341 N.Y.S.2d 411 (1972).
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On the other hand, in applying the strict scrutiny test to the
immunization area, the courts may be persuaded to find that routine
immunization regulations should no longer be permitted to interfere
with the religious rights of individuals, at least in certain circumstances. 7 8 In the past, stringent vaccination and immunization laws
have been required because of the fear of the spread of deadly
diseases. But with various jurisdictions significantly altering their im79
munization regulations, and creating religious preference exemptions,
there is an indication that the immediacy of the health factors that
once led to the stringent requirements is no longer so great."
Legislatures that have passed religious exemption statutes have done so
not only in deference to sincere religious beliefs, but also because they
realized that such an exemption would create a minimal hazard to
society. 8
Even in those states that have created religious exemptions,
however, the exemption is not necessarily an indication that the state
legislature does not truthfully believe that the first amendment
religious freedoms are still subordinate to the compelling state interest
82
of preventing the spread of communicable disease. A New York
court, in Maier v. Besser,83 expressed the viewpoint that although the
state had created a religious exemption, it was not required to do so.
The medical practice of immunization and vaccination against diptheria
and smallpox has been recognized for many years, and the power of the
state, through its legislative body, to make such immunization and vaccinations mandatory for pupils, without exemptions based on religious
beliefs or convictions, is valid by constitutional standards as a reasonable
exercise of police power." '
78. The circumstances referred to here are non-emergency or non-epidemic circumstances. If there is no epidemic, or no real threat of an epidemic, then the balancing of the interests test may be shifted toward the religious freedom side. A clearly
recognizable argument for the government's side, however, is that it should not have
to await an actual epidemic to take precautions, especially considering the havoc that
certain diseases caused in the past.
79. See notes 56 & 57 supra.
80. Admittedly, the severe health problems that plagued countries in early
decades of this century are no longer prevalent. Arguably, however, the reason why
the health situation has improved is because of the passage of vaccination and immurization laws. Furthermore, many of the childhood diseases still pose an ominous

threat to the safety of the nation's school children.

GUIDE TO CHILDHOOD IMMUNIZA-

supra note 3, at 4.
81. See Dalli v. Board of Educ., 358 Mass. 753, 267 N.E.2d 219 (1971).
82. See Maier v. Besser, 73 Misc. 2d 241, 341 N.Y.S.2d 411 (1972).
83. Id.
84. Id. at 243, 341 N.Y.S.2d at 412.

TION,
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Nevertheless, a strong argument can be expounded that although the
states giving religious exemptions may just be giving state gratuities,
these exemptions are still a persuasive indication of a legislative
judgment that the state interest that previously existed is now less
compelling. For example some states have stopped requiring smallpox
vaccinations because of the rarity of that disease. Courts, too, may be
prompted to re-evaluate the status of immunization laws, and reconsider whether the state's interest is still so compelling as to override the
fundamental rights of individuals in these cases.
Although the public need is obvious when an epidemic threatens, it
is questionable whether a state can adequately demonstrate that those
pupils not routinely immunized create an immediate or threatened
danger to the public. 85 Religious objectors are in the same situation as
those who cannot receive the inoculations for various health reasons,"
and those unimmunized individuals have not created a serious health
problem for society. Moreover, if religious objectors are given an
exemption to the immunization requirements, the only people exposed
to any threat will be the objectors themselves. 87 Where a majority of
people are inoculated the public is safe from the spread of disease, and
the governments' major purpose in requiring the immunization of the
religious individual then becomes the protection of the individual
himself. 8 And where the only affected person is the person religiously
objecting to such laws, the recent Supreme Court cases point to wide
leniency for religious freedom.8 9 On the other hand, the courts are not
likely to easily yield to these arguments because they have been reluctant to depart from their precedential deference to public necessity in
this area.
In order to raise the religious attack against immunization laws the
individual must hold sincere religious beliefs. 90 In those states that
have promulgated exemptions for religious beliefs, the individual must
prove as a necessary condition to the exemption that he or she is a true
member of a religious organization whose beliefs are contrary to such
85. See L. TRIBE, supra note 11, at 857.
86. Today children who are in poor health or who are allergic to the inoculations
are not forced to receive them, and may still freely attend school. See MASS. GEN.
LAWS ANN. ch. 76, §15 (West Supp. 1979).
87. See L. TRIBE, supra note 11, at 857. There is an argument that those individuals who cannot take the immunizations for various health reasons are subject to
a greater risk if more of the general population are not immunized.
88. Id. The state argument of protecting the individual child when the parent objects to immunization is persuasive here. See note 76 supra.
89. See Wisconsin v. Yoder, 406 U.S. 205 (1972); Sherbert v. Verner, 374 U.S.
398 (1963).
90. See Wisconsin v. Yoder, 406 U.S. 205, 215 (1972).
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immunization, or that he is an adherent of religious beliefs similar to
those of the organization. 9 ' In some instances people with strong personal convictions against these laws have been required to submit to
inoculations because they were not members of exempt religious
organizations. 92 If individuals with religious beliefs contrary to immunization laws can either claim a statutory exemption in some states,
or mount a constitutional challenge to the law in others, perhaps
individuals with similar strong personal convictions, though not
religiously based, ought not be compelled to submit to immunizations as a condition of school attendance.9 3 Another possible constitutional basis of attack against immunization laws, which is applicable to
all citizens, is the right of privacy.
IV.

THE RIGHT OF PRIVACY CHALLENGE TO IMMUNIZATION LAWS

A.

The Developing Right of PersonalPrivacy

There is a right of privacy that has been developed in various areas
of the law during recent years.9 ' This emerging right of personal
privacy covers a broad spectrum of fundamental rights, and is being
used to invalidate state legislation.9 5 Although the right of privacy has
not been recognized in the vaccination and immunization area, it could
have a significant role in challenges to immunization regulations in the
future. This right may be the most useful basis for challenge by individuals who vehemently oppose these required medical practices but
cannot base their objections on religious principles.9 6
91. McCartney v. Austin, 57 Misc. 2d 525, 293 N.Y.S.2d 188 (1968), aff'd, 298
N.Y.S.2d 26 (1969); In re Elwell, 55 Misc. 2d 252, 284 N.Y.S.2d 924 (1967); Maier v.
Besser, 73 Misc. 2d 241, 341 N.Y.S.2d 411 (1972). See also Dalli v. Board of Educ.,
358 Mass. 753, 267 N.E.2d 219 (1971).
92. See note 91 supra. In McCartney v. Austin, 57 Misc. 2d 525, 293 N.Y.S.2d
188 (1968), aff'd, 298 N.Y.S.2d 26 (1969), the New York court found that although a
parent of Roman Catholic faith may for personal reasons object to inoculations, they
do not fall within the statutory religious exemption, and thus had to obey the law. But
in Dalli v. Board of Educ., 358 Mass. 753, 267 N.E.2d 219 (1971), the Massachusetts
Supreme Court held that the exemption statute giving special perference to certain
religious groups would be in violation of the equal protection clause if it did not give
the same preference to others with the same religious beliefs.
93. Giving special preference only to certain religious organizations can create
problems. Which religious groups deserve the protection, and which ones do not?
Similarly, determining whether an individual possesses sincere religious convictions
against immunizations, when he is not a member of a religious organization, is alsodifficult. See L. TRIBE, supra note 11, at 884-85.
94. Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S. 113 (1973); Griswold v. Connecticut, 381 U.S. 479
(1965). See also Brown & Truitt, Euthanasiaand the Right to Die, 3 OHIO N.U.L.
REV. 615 (1976).
95. See note 108 and accompanying text infra.
96. The right of privacy is a much broader constitutional right than the free exer-
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The Supreme Court recognizes a fundamental right of personal
7
privacy although it is not explicitly enumerated in the Constitution."
Early decisions of the Court recognized a right of privacy but did not
98
declare the constitutional right of personal privacy. In 1891 the
99
Supreme Court, in Union Pacific Railway Co. v. Botsford, stated
that: "No right is held more sacred, or is more carefully guarded by
the common law, than the right of every individual to the possession
of
and control of his own person, free from restraint or interference
0° Later,
law.''
others unless by clear and unquestionable authority of
in Meyer v. Nebraska, 10,Justice McReynolds gave a broad description
of the concept of liberty found in the fourteenth amendment.
Without doubt, it denotes not merely freedom from bodily restraint but
also the right of the individual to contract, to engage in any of the common occupations of life, to acquire useful knowledge, to marry,
establish a home and bring up children, to worship God according to the
dictates of his own conscience, and generally to enjoy those privileges
long recognized at common law as essential to the orderly pursuit of happiness by free men.10 "
Despite these eloquent statements, it was not until 1965 that the
right of personal privacy was explicitly accepted as a constitutional
03
right in Griswold v. Connecticut.1 The Griswold Court entertained a
constitutional challenge to a Connecticut birth control law that prohibited the use of birth control devices or the giving of advice on these
devices. The Court found that the right of privacy was a constitutional
right emanating from the penumbras of the Bill of Rights and ruled
that the right of marital privacy fell within the protected scope of this
constitutional right. 0' Finding the right of privacy to be a fundamental

cise of religion. Thus, the right of privacy is applicable to all citizens, and not just
religious believers. L. TRIBE, supra note 11, at 885.
97. Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S. 113 (1973). See also 27 U. MIAMI L. REV. 481, 482
(1973).
98. See Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S. 113, 152 (1973); Meyer v. Nebraska, 262 U.S. 390
(1923).
99. 141 U.S. 250 (1891).
100. Id. at 251.
101. 262 U.S. 390 (1923).

102.

Id. at 399.

103. 381 U.S. 479 (1965).
104. Id. The precise right of personal privacy that was established in Griswold was
perceived as arising from diverse sources within the Bill of Rights and fourteenth
amendment. Justice Goldberg, concurring, argued that the right of privacy could be
located in the ninth amendment. Id. at 486-87. Justice Harlan, concurring, argued that
the right of privacy evolves from the due process clause of the fourteenth amendment.

Id. at 500.
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right the Court then applied the strict scrutiny method of analysis. '
Because no compelling state interest could be demonstrated to override
the constitutional right of privacy, the Court invalidated the Connecticut statute.' 6
The right of personal privacy is based primarily on the theory that
the individual has the right to control his own body, and to make fundamental decisions that will guide his own destiny.'" 7 Since Griswold
other Supreme Court rulings recognized the right of personal or bodily
privacy in various factual contexts." 8 The constitutional right of personal privacy was found to embrace marital decisions and also to
outweigh state interests in such private decisions. 0 9 Similarly, it was
held to override state interests in personal decisions involving the use
0 In one of the most controversial Court decisions,
of contraceptives. "1

the right of privacy was found to outweigh state interests in the field of
abortion during the earlier stages of pregnancy."'I In the landmark
case of Roe v. Wade,"I2 a Texas abortion statute was challenged as an
infringement upon the personal right of privacy of pregnant mothers.
The Court expressed the view that the right of privacy is founded in
the fourteenth amendment's concept of ordered liberty and is broad
enough to encompass a woman's decision whether or not to terminate
her pregnancy. "13 The Court then applied the strict scrutiny analysis, requiring the state to show a compelling interest sufficient to override the

105. A majority of the Justices clearly applied the strict scrutiny method of
analysis in the various separate opinions written. 381 U.S. 479 (1965).
106. Id. at 497-98.
107. See Whalen v. Roe, 429 U.S. 589 (1977). See also Comment, Adjudicating
What Yoder Left Unresolved: Religious Rights .for Minor Children After Danforth
and Carey, 126 U. PA. L. REV. 1135, 1155 (1978); Goldenberg, Right to Abortion: Expansion of the Right of Privacy Through the Fourteenth Amendment, 19 CATH. LAW.
36 (1973).
108. Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S. 113 (1973) (right of privacy is broad enough to cover a
woman's decision of whether to terminate her pregnancy; invalidating a state abortion
statute); Eisenstadt v. Baird, 405 U.S. 438 (1972) (right of privacy covers decision of
whether to beget a child; invalidating a state contraceptive law).
109. In Loving v. Virginia, 388 U.S. 1, 12 (1967), the Court invalidated a Virginia
statute that prohibited racial intermarriage, finding that the right of privacy covered
the freedom to marry the person of one's choice.
110. In Eisenstadt v. Baird, 405 U.S. 438 (1972), the Court struck down a state
statute that banned the sale of contraceptives to unmarried persons. The Court stated:
"If the right of privacy means anything, it is the right of the individual, married or
single, to be free from unwarranted governmental intrusion into matters so fundamentally affecting a person as the decision whether to bear or beget a child." Id. at 453
(emphasis in original).
I11. Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S. 113 (1973).
112. Id.
113. Id.at 153.

Published by eCommons, 1979

UNIVERSITY OF DA YTON LA W REVIEW

[Vol. 4:2

fundamental right of privacy. Because the state could not adequately
demonstrate a compelling interest during the first three months of a
woman's pregnancy, the Court declared the abortion law too broad."'
In addition to these factual and legal situations, the right of
privacy is currently being urged in the euthanasia and right to die
areas. 5 The right of privacy has already been applied by a New Jersey
court to the decision to disconnect medical life support systems in In re
Quinlan.I'6
A recent Supreme Court decision seems to further broaden the pro7 Whalen v. Roe'
tections afforded under the right of privacy.
involved a constitutional challenge to a New York drug law, contending that a doctor-patient relationship fell within the constitutionally
protected zone of personal privacy. In defining the boundaries of the
right of privacy, the Court opinion indicated that the right of privacy
encompassed a broader area of protection than just the series of fac9
tual situations considered in previous decisions.' The Court stated
that the right of privacy embraced both a general individual interest in
avoiding disclosures of personal matters, and a general individual
114. Id. at 164-65. In summary, the Court stated that during the first trimester the
state could show no compelling interest, and therefore the abortion decision had to be
left to the mother. During the second trimester, however, the state has a compelling
interest in protecting the health of the mother, and may regulate abortion if it chooses
to do so. Finally, in the last trimester the state has a compelling interest in the potentiality of human life, and may regulate abortion during that period also. Id.
115. See, e.g., In re Quinlan, 70 N.J. 10, 355 A.2d 647 (1976), cert. denied, 429
U.S. 922 (1976). See also Brown & Truitt, Euthanasiaand the Right to Die, 3 OHIO
N.U.L. REV. 615 (1976).
It is also noteworthy that the Supreme Court has ruled that not only adults, but also
children have constitutional privacy rights. See Carey v. Population Serv. Int'l, 431
U.S. 678 (1977); Planned Parenthood v. Danforth, 428 U.S. 52 (1976); Note, The
Minor's Right to Consent to Medical Treatment: A Corollary of the Constitutional
Right of Privacy, 48 S. CAL. L. REV. 1417 (1975). Thus, it seems not only parents, but
also children themselves may constitutionally object to vaccination and immunization
regulations.
116. 70 N.J. 10, 355 A.2d 64 (1976), cert. denied, 429 U.S. 922 (1976). In the
Quinlan case the Supreme Court of New Jersey found that the individual's right of
privacy outweighed the state interest in preserving life, where the individual was a
hospital patient maintained on a respirator and could never resume a substantial life.
Id. at 38-41, 355 A.2d at 662-64.
117. See Whalen v. Roe, 429 U.S. 589 (1977).
118. Id.
119. Id. at 599-600. In previous cases the right of privacy had been found to deal
with matters concerning procreation, marriage, contraception, family relationships,
abortion, and child rearing and education. Although the Court did not expressly state
that the right of personal privacy has a much broader connotation than these factual
situations, the Court's decision does suggest that the right of privacy applies to more
than just personal decisions in these areas. The suggestion emanates from the Court's
broad definition of the right of privacy. See also L. TRIBE, supra note 11, at 886.
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interest in the independence of making certain kinds of important decisions.' 20 Thus, the Whalen decision provides a basis for extending the
right of personal privacy to reach other important individual decisions
like, perhaps, the decision whether to submit to vaccination and
immunization.
B. The Right of Personal Privacy as a ConstitutionalAttack on Immunization Laws
The issue is whether, when they possess personal convictions
against immunization, the parents or their children can use their
constitutional right of personal privacy as an effective defense against
immunization requirements. The right of personal privacy, like other
constitutional rights, is not an absolute privilege.'"' As the Supreme
Court in Roe v. Wade 2 2 pointed out: "The Court's decisions recognizing a right of privacy also acknowledge that some state regulation in
areas protected by that right is appropriate.... [A] state may properly
assert important interests in safeguarding health, in maintaining
medical standards, and in protecting potential life."' 23 The Wade
Court also recognized that an individual does not have the unlimited
right to do with his body as he pleases but that he must fulfill certain
social requirements.' 2 Therefore, while the right of personal privacy is
a highly fundamental right, it is limited by compelling state interests,
one of which may be the protection of the public from the spread of
communicable diseases.
The Supreme Court in Roe v. Wade stated that only those personal
rights which can be deemed fundamental are included under the
guarantee of personal privacy. ' 21 Thus, the initial question that must
be resolved is whether the decision to refuse personal vaccination or
immunization is so fundamental as to fall within the right of personal
privacy.
The decision to refuse immunization is analogous to other personal
decisions in which a right of privacy has been found to exist.' 26 The
120. 429 U.S. at 599-600.
121. Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S. 113, 154 (1973). See also Delgado, Euthanasia
Reconsidered-The Choice of Death as an Aspect of the Right of Privacy, 17 ARiz. L.
REV. 474 (1975).

122.
123.

410 U.S. 113 (1973).
Id. at 153-54.

124.

Id. The Court cited Jacobson v. Massachusetts, 197 U.S. 11 (1905) in its

opinion as an example that an individual does not have an unlimited right to do with
one's body as he pleases. Therefore, the Court may be suggesting that even if the right
to object to immunization falls within the right of privacy, that right is still outweighed
by the compelling state interest in the promotion of the public health.
125.

410 U.S. at 152.

126. Griswold v. Connecticut, 381 U.S. 479 (1965) (right to make decisions about
use of contraceptives); Eisenstadt v. Baird, 405 U.S. 438 (1972) (decisions involving use
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decision to use contraceptives, the decision to procreate, the decision
to die, and the decision to abort, all have similar characteristics to the
decision of whether to submit one's body to immunization. The
in
underlying characteristic is the individual's independent interest
1 27
Immaking an important decision with regard to his own body.
munizations are nothing short of an assault upon one's body, because
of the procedure in which they are administered, and the introduction
12 8
There is always some risk of
of a foreign substance into the body.
dangerous side effects. Therefore, the decision of whether to accept
immunization is an intimate choice for many individuals as the decision whether to abort, or use contraceptives is an intimate choice for
others.
If the decision to accept or reject immunizations is encompassed in
the control over one's own body, and thus falls within the protection of
the constitutional right of privacy, the state must then meet the
requirements of the strict1 29scrutiny test in order to continue its immunization requirements.
Many of the same considerations weighed in discussing the free
exercise of religion attack on compulsory inoculations earlier in the
comment'3 0 will predominate when the right of privacy is raised as a
constitutional challenge to immunization regulations. Although the individual decision of whether to submit to immunization is an intimate
one, it nevertheless affects the entire community's susceptibility to
disease. 3 ' Obviously the states do have a legitimate interest in protecof contraceptives); Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S. 113 (1973) (right to make decisions on abortion); In re Quinlan, 70 N.J. 10, 355 A.2d 647 (1976), cert. denied, 429 U.S. 922 (1976).
(right to die decisions); Skinner v. Oklahoma, 316 U.S. 535 (1942) (procreation decisions). The right of privacy has been found to cover all of these personal decisions.
127. See Whalen v. Roe, 429 U.S. 589 (1977). The Supreme Court in this case indicated that the right of privacy extended protection to those circumstances where
there is a general interest in independence in making certain kinds of important decisions. Id. at 599-600. Arguably the decision with regards to immunization falls within
this protection.
128. Itz v. Penick, 493 S.W.2d 506, 508 (Tex. Sup. Ct. 1973).
129. In Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S. 113, 155 (1973), the Court stated: "Where certain
'fundamental rights' are involved, the Court has held that regulation limiting these
rights may be justified only by a 'compelling state interest' . . . and that the legislative
enactment must be narrowly drawn to express only the legitimate state interests at
stake."
130. See text accompanying notes 74-89 supra.
131. See Jacobson v. Massachusetts, 197 U.S. 11 (1905). If a child is not immunized and contracts a contagious disease, he may spread that disease to his other
classmates, or to other people in the community with whom he comes in contact.
However, the individual objector can counter that claim by pointing out that if the majority of people are immunized who desire to be so, then he is the only one who runs
the risk of contracting the illness.
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ting the public against the spread of communicable diseases, and an
arguable step towards that protection is the requirement that school
children in frequent and close physical proximity be immunized. 13 2 A
great probability remains that the courts will find a compelling state
interest sufficient to outweigh the rights of the individual.'
Nevertheless, the individual objecting to the immunization laws on
privacy grounds does have a position worthy of consideration. Considering the state of public health today as compared to the epidemic
periods of the past, vaccinations and immunizations are arguably not so
vitally important. 3 " Furthermore, the objector can stress that the
present legislative immunization exemptions are confirmation that the
state's interest is less compelling. '" Although these arguments may not
cause the courts to alter their previous findings in the immunization
area, the courts should at least carefully apply the strict scrutiny test,
and reconsider whether the state can demonstrate an interest persuasive
enough to be deemed a compelling state interest. Courts could require
a showing by the state that an emergency health problem exists, or that
every disease for which immunization is required is both contagious
and prevalent at the time of the immunization requirements. Otherwise
the state statute could be invalidated as infringing upon a fundamental
right, and being overly broad in its application, 136 because of the lesser
public necessity in non-epidemic situations. Nevertheless, because of
the inertia of precedent and the human experience with serious health
problems in the past, the immunization laws for school children will
not be lightly overturned.
V.

CONCLUSION

Presently, the law in the vaccination and immunization area is
firmly established. States are regularly permitted through their police
power to promulgate regulations that require the vaccination and immunization of school children as a condition precedent of their school
attendance. Challenges to these regulations by individuals vehemently
132. The states also have the persuasive interest of protecting the welfare of the
child. See text accompanying note 76 supra.
133. The courts that limit themselves to following precedent will find a compelling
state interest automatically in the immunization area. Courts may also be tempted to
find a compelling state interest in deference to the state legislatures, because of their
reluctance to overrule a legislature's determination of public necessity.
134. National health today is in a much better state than in the early decades of
this century when smallpox and polio flourished. One reason health is in a much better
state presently, however, could be the vaccination and immunization regulations in effect for many decades.
135. See notes 56 & 57 supra.
136. See, e.g., NAACP v. Alabama, 377 U.S. 288 (1964).
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opposed to such medical treatment have been consistenly rejected
throughout this century.
One of the most frequent attacks on the immunization laws has
been the contention that they interfere with the free exercise of
religion. This claim has been rejected, however, because a compelling
state interest in the protection of public health is generally found to
override the individual's fundamental rights. Nevertheless, because of
recent alterations in the law by various state legislatures, many
religious objectors are no longer forced to submit to the medical treatment. This recent trend, along with the increased protection of
religiously motivated conduct recognized in Wisconsin v. Yoder'3 7 and
the realization that the present state of health is quite different than
when these regulations were by necessity first passed, could lead to
significant alterations in these immunization laws in both the state
legislatures and the courts.
For other individuals who hold personal convictions against submitting themselves to immunization, the developing constitutional
right of privacy may ultimately provide relief even in the absence of
religious motivation. Before Roe v. Wade," 8 the right of privacy had
been reiected in abortion.' 39 A closer examination of the individual's
right of privacy as balanced against the state's interest in protecting
public health could provide similar changes in the definition of rights
in the future.'"" It has already led to alterations in such fields as abortion, euthanasia, marriage, and the use of contraceptives. Although
the right of privacy has not yet been extended to the immunization
area, it would be reasonable to expect that type of extension.
At the same time, the public health need may be less pressing for
routine, compulsory immunization. The expanded respect for
religiously motivated conduct and the expanded protection of fundamental personal choices may bring about a change in the results of
the balancing test that has until now left the state interest prevailing.
Thomas E. Dover
137. 406 U.S. 205 (1972).
138. 410 U.S. 113 (1973).
139. See, e.g., State v. Munson, 86 S.D. 663, 201 N.W.2d 123 (1972).
140. One possible change in the immunization laws could be to require the individuals who possess personal convictions against such laws, to submit to the inoculations only if health problems are found to exist in the community.
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